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ABSTRACT
Voluntary participation is posed as a problem in choice behavior.
We are concerned here with the effect on that choice of certain organizational 
variables which seemed central to some major arguments and research in the 
literature. A stochastic model is presented whose parametric composition 
is specified by particular combinations of those variables. After its 
presentation in the abstract, the model is used to analytically examine a 
set of specific structural situations, four of which were then chosen for 
experimental investigation. These particular four were selected because we 
believe they 9peak to a major dispute in the literature— that between 
Robert llichels and Lipset, Trow and Coleman. The results of the experiments 
are then used in a preliminary empirical evaluation of the model.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING:
A MODEL AND AH EXPERIMENTAL TEST
This paper is concerned with structural factors which affect voluntary 
participation in organizational decision-making. Our purpose is to specify 
the relationship between a member's choice to participate or not and certain 
organizational variables which we considered central to some classic agruments 
and research in the area. Our specification takes the form of a stochastic 
model whose parametric composition is determined by specific combinations of 
those variables. After presenting the model in the abstract, we use it to 
examine some structural situations of particular interest to us, four of which 
were investigated in the experiment described later in the paper.
The focus upon participation rates emerged from our efforts to understand 
what modifications were implied for Michels' argument (1915) about the inevita­
bility of oligarchy in light of the contradictory evidence described in Union 
Democracy (Lipset, et. al., 1956). In the process of analyzing these two works, 
our conception of the problem grew in generality and complexity and \ie then 
turned to more recent literature to overcome the limitations imposed upon both 
Michels' and Lipset, et. al.'s arguments by their concentration on particular 
empirical instances of interest to them. In doing this we were influenced by 
many people, but particularly by Mancur Olson's discussion of collective goods 
in Loffic of Collective Action (1965) and by William Gamson's Power and Discon­
tent (1968). Our indebtness to these two men is considerably more pervasive 
than might be inferred from the few citations made below.
We will begin by sketching out those aspects of Michels' and Lipset, 
et. al's arguments which posed problems to be resolved or shaped our thinking 
in some important way. This will serve to facilitate the reader's understand­
ing of our formulation, acknowledge the importance of these two works to its 
development, and indicate the bearing of our work upon theirs.
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LIPSET AND 1IICHELS
In Michels' argument, one essential difference between oligarchy and 
democracy is that in the former, organizational decision-making is an exclusive 
activity involving the small group of people who occupy positions at the top 
of the hierarchy while in the latter, decision-making entails the active 
participation of the rank-and-file.’*’ The essence of the "Iron Law" is that 
the very form of division of labor which defines an organization— i.e. a 
formally-designated administrative hierarchy— makes the concentration of 
decision-raaking activities in the hands of the leaders inevitable, even in 
organizations which have explicitly intended democratic ¿,oals and procedures 
at their inception. In his discussion of the dynamics of this inevitability, 
Michels focused upon the process by which rank-and-file come to abrogate the 
decision-making rights they do possess by failing to exercise them and upon 
how, over time, this differentiation of function is legitimated in the rules 
and ideology of their organization.
In taking this approach to explaining the differential participation 
between leaders and non-leaders in organizational activities, Michels was led 
to an explicit discussion of individual motivation processes. That is, he 
considered what factors motivate individuals to seek and then protect positions 
of leadership and what motivates the rest of the membership to abdicate their 
decision-making rights, lie argued that leaders are specifically and differ­
entially rewarded for their activities— sufficiently so that, in his opinion, 
understanding why individuals might seek juch positions was unproblematic. 
Concerning the ranic-and-file, ne argued that there are no significant rewards 
which accrue to them for participation in organizational decision-making.
The benefits which account for an individual's interest in belonging to the
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organization in the first place are sufficient to produce passive membership
only; all major motivational sources of active participation are associated 
2with high office.
In addition to postulating a general absence of organizational rewards 
for rank-and-file participation, liichels argued that there are factors in 
any group with an explicit vertical division of labor which operate to inhibit 
what little motivation might exist. The most important of these are the value 
placed on the expertise of the leader, the belief in the efficiency of small 
decision-making units, and the various techniques of insulation available to 
leaders with vested interests in maintaining their positions. The combined 
effect of all these is to create what liichels identified as the source of the 
inherent instability of all democracies— the apathy of the masses.
The argument in Union Democracy is in basic agreement with liichels' 
regarding the motivations for seeking and protecting positions of leadership; 
however, it takes issue with him about the possible existence of motivational 
structures which would produce and maintain high rates of rank-and-file 
participation. Lipset and his colleagues contended that at least one such 
structure does exist (The International Typographical Union) and that this 
organization is stable and persistent, not merely in a temporary stage of the 
dynamic expressed in the Iron Law. The particular feature of the ITU which 
they identified as accounting for its being an exception to liichels' thesis 
is, of course, its txvo-party political system. The authors contended that 
such a system not only can reduce the impact of the dynamics iiichels described, 
but that it also ensures direct positive motivation for rank-and-file participa 
tion in decision-making. It is this last which we take to be most crucial to 
Michels' argument about the inevitability of membership apathy.
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To understand how the two-party system bears on participation and thereby 
speaks to liichels* thesis, we must recognize that both authors had in mind 
a specific kind of organization— one in which the outcomes of many of its 
decisions are what liancur Olson (1965) calls collective goods; i.e. outcomes 
which accrue to everyone in the organization by virtue of the simple fact 
of membership. The material or substantive aspect of any particular 
collective good is identical for all members, but its worth or value is not 
necessarily the same for each of them. For some it may be highly rewarding; 
for others, it may actually have negative utility.
An important characteristic of organizations providing collective goods 
is that an individual's participation is not normally rewarded in the sense 
of a unit of reward for a unit of participation. For the reward value of a 
collective good to accrue to some particular member, it is necessary that a 
decision get made but not that he participate in making it. This would seem 
to imply that Michels might have been correct in assuming that organizational 
collective benefits are not sufficient sources of motivation for participation. 
In contrast to the rank-and-file, leaders receive additional direct rewards 
for their participation (e.g. prestige, deference, perhaps even financial 
compension).
There are times when rank-and-file participation is also directly rewarded. 
Lipset, et.al., for example, contended that the existence of a strong friendship 
system among the membership encourages participation by providing social rewards 
for it. It seems to us, however, that the main thrust of the Union Democracy 
argument was that the case of the ITU counters Michels' argument NOT because 
its unusual friendship structure directly rewards participation, but primarily 
because if its txro-party political system. The importance of the friendship
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system of the ITU lies in the second function the authors' attribute to it—  
namely that it serves to maintain the political system. We shall proceed, 
therefore, in our specification of the problem in a way which assumes that 
rank-and-file participation is not directly rewarded.
Lipset and his colleagues were describing an organization in which it is 
usual to have patterned and open disagreemtnt about what constitutes a 
satisfactory collective good. The ITU has a formally articulated, decentralized 
authority structure in which two or more alternatives (each of which designates 
different collective goods) are regularly produced for rank-and-file valuation 
and selection. A member of one party knows that there is another group in 
the organization which consistently evaluates outcomes differently. Prior to 
a decision opportunity, he expects that the members of the other group will 
want a different alternative from the one he prefers. Since the selection of 
a collective good means deciding upon one and only one alternative, it is to 
the individual's advantage to do what he can to ensure that the alternative 
most rewarding to him gets chosen. If, through inactivity, he permits the 
decision to be made by members of an opposing group (or by leaders who may be 
members of that group), he can be fairly confident that the outcomes will not 
be those most rewarding to him. Rank-and-file participation in such an 
organization is motivated by a desire to improve the probability of 
preferred decisional outcomes.
Both authors, then, postulate certain structural conditions which affect 
the stability of a decentralized authority distribution by virtue of their 
effects on rank-and-file participation rates. Michels argued that the reward 
structure of an organization providing collective goods is such as to make the 
active exercise of decision-making rights by non-leaders unlikely. The resultant
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inactivity operates to increase the centralization of actual decision-making 
in the hands of leaders, who are directly rewarded for such activity and who 
are generally regarded as more competent. Due to vested interests which 
leaders develop in maintaining their positions and to the value of decision­
making control in doing so, this centralization is protected and eventually 
becomes irreversable. Lipset et.al.'s discussion suggests that if members 
are not directly rewarded for participation and if they find themselves already 
receiving rewarding collective goods without participation, such a trend 
towards centralization might well be expected and, once institutionalized, 
would be difficult to reverse. However, if for some reason a persistent 
pattern of disagreement over decisional alternatives is created at a point 
before the rank-and-file have lost their decision-making rights, motivation for 
the active exercise of those rights is likely and Michels' process is aborted 
at the very beginning.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
At this point we shall move away from the specifics of these two
♦
works and cast the argument in more general terms. Within every organization 
providing collective goods, there are specifiable structural conditions which 
differentially affect the way in which members will be able to and will want to 
become actively involved in the decision-making of their organization. In turn, 
the pattern of their activity affects the expected persistence of the organza- 
tion’s current authority structure directly or does so indirectly by permitting 
other processes to operate. Our primary focus in the remainder of this paper 
is upon the first step of this sequence— that is, upon a formal specification 
of the effects of structural variables upon the individual's choice to
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participate. We will be concerned to some extent with the second step in the 
process (i.e. with the effects of participation patterns on the stability of 
the authority system); but we shall not treat this problem in a formal manner.
We shall discuss the effects of two variables suggested by the preceding 
discussion. The first is the nature of the organization's authority distribu­
tion— whether it is centralized or decentralized. The second is the presence 
or absence of patterned disagreement, either of the sort Lipset et.al describec. 
between subgroups of the rank-and-file or that between leaders and their 
followers as Michels predicted was inevitable. We shall refer to these two 
patterns of disagreement as horizontal and vertical disagreement respectively.
An explicit focus upon disagreement patterns suggests another variable not 
directly discussed in the previous paragraphs, namely whether the parties in 
disagreement can be influenced by each other.
THE MODEL
In order to specify rigorously how these variables affect the choice to 
participate we will first examine the process by which individuals choose 
among alternatives. Imagine an organizational decision-making situation which 
has two alternatives, Y^ and Y .^ Alternative Y^ has positive utility value for 
a given actor (A); Y^ has no utility value for him. If he is given the 
opportunity to participate in the selection of one of these as the group out­
come, we argue that his decision to accept or decline that opportunity will be 
a function of: a) whatever he must expend in order to participate [designated 
u(E)], b) the utility to him of the two alternatives, [u(Y^ ) and uiY^)], and c) 
his subjective assessment of the likelihood that each alternative will be select 
ed with and without his participation. If we let a designate his expectation
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that (his preference) will be chosen given that he does participate and £ 
symbolize his subjective expectation that Y^ will be selected even if he does 
not, then his utility structure can be expressed as follows:
Figure 1 Here
What the diagram indicates is that if the individual does participate,
he forfeits whatever he has to expend in order to do so [u(E)], and with
probability a expects to gain the rewards he associates with alternative Y^ .
He is aware that even if he does participate, with some probability [designated
a], he will lose— i.e. Y^ will be chosen as the group outcome. If he loses,
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he expends u(E) but gains nothing since u(Y£) =0. If the individual 
decides not to participate, he expends nothing and may yet, with probability 6, 
gain the rewards he associates with Y^ .
Which choice the individual makes is a function of the composition of the 
two branches of the utility structure (i.e. participation and non-participation). 
In order to know whether an individual will participate or not, we must 
identify that function and specify the parameters and utilities for the partic­
ular structural contexts of interest to us.
The Choice Function: The function we will use is the one developed by 
Camilleri and Berger (1967). That function asserts that the ratio of the 
choice probabilities of two, mutually exclusive alternatives (e.g. participation 
and non-participation) is equal to the ratio of their expected gains. Hie 
expected gain of a particular alternative equals the sum of the positive 
utilities associated with that alternative, each weighted by its probability, 
minus the sum of the negative utilities associated with the rejected
alternative(s), each weighted by its probability. The approach is p-centric;
we are dealing with the actor's evaluations of events aiid his subjective
expectations about their likelihood of happening. Because the sum of the
choice probabilities of two exhaustive but mutually exclusive alternatives
must be unity, the probability of one alternative being selected is simply the
ratio of its expected gain to the sum of the expected gains in both.
Applying this function to the hypothetical utility structure just
sketched in figure 1 , the probability that an individual will participate is
equal to the ratio of the expected gain in participation to the combined gain
of both courses of action. The expected gain in participation is simply
au(Y-), since in this case we have set u(Y ) = 0. The expected gain in not 
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participating is 6u(Y^) + u(E); u(Y^) is, in this case the only positive
utility associated with not participating; and in choosing that course of
action, the individual avoids whatever "expense!1 participation would have
entailed for him. The total expected gain in the situation is simply the sum
of the expected gains in both: au(Y..) + £u(Y ) + u(E). The probability that
au(Yx)
A decides to participate is: )" + ~gu (ÿ־־ ) T ־u־(E ־(׳ * Similarly, the
6u(Yx) + u(E)
probability that he will not participate is : — ^ 3 ׳ +—5־ ^'(^)— +~ü(E) *
Having identified the choice function we will use, it remains for us to 
specify the utilities and to identify how the structural variables we have 
discussed determine the parameters a and 3.
Utilities : Our discussion of utilities will be brief since we are not 
concerned here with the impact of variations in the cost-reward structure upon 
participation. The choice function does preserve our intuitive idea about the
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importance of the issue up for decision in the organization. As the subjective 
worth of a decisional alternative increases, so does the probability of A's 
participation (when a and 8 are held constant). Similarly, as the cost 
entailed in participation increases, the probability of A's participation 
declines. If none of the decisional alternatives has any utility for A, the 
model predicts he will not participate. However, to isolate the effects of 
structurally different situations upon participation, variations in the 
utilities of the decisional alternatives and in u(E) must be controlled. 
Consequently, our discussion will proceed as if these utilities were the same 
for all situations; and we attempted to ensure that our experimental con­
ditions did not differ in this regard. To predict the participation rates for 
the four experimental conditions, we estimated the ratio of u(Y^) to u(E); 
and that ratio takes on the same value in each of the four equations. The 
exact estimation procedures are described later.
Parameters : The specification of a and 8 is our main concern since these 
parameters represent expectations which are based upon the organization's 
authority distribution and agreement structure— features which affect 
participation rates because they affect members' beliefs about how participation 
determines decisional outcomes.
With the cost-reward ratio held constant, the probability of A's participa­
tion increases as the difference between a and 8 increases; and for any given 
difference between a and 8, participation increases as the value of 
8 increases. 8 represents A's expectations that the organization will select 
his preference even if he does not participate, and a represents his expectation 
that his preference will be selected if he does. To avoid discussing the case 
in which an individual expects his own participation to reduce the liklihood 
of his preference being selected, we assume that a is never less than 8.
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Consider a decentralized authority system in which the right to make 
binding decisions resulting in collective goods is dispersed among all 
franchized members. The actions of the officers may be necessary for a 
decision to be binding,"* but it is not sufficient. A vote by some quorum of 
the general membership is essential. All who vote, officers and non-officers 
alike, must influence anyone who is franchized to secure their preferred 
outcome. Compare this with an oligarchy in which the right to make binding 
decisions belongs to the incumbents of high office. They need to influence 
the rank-and-file only because they value consensus or morale per se, because 
consensus is valuable in maintaining their positions, or because they wish to 
spare themselves sanction costs.
Rank-and-file participation in these two systems is different. In a 
centralized system, 3 represents A's expectation that the leaders will, with­
out his participation, select his preference as the group's outcome. If 3 
is high then either A sees that the leaders already agree with him or, if they 
disagree, that they are very likely to be persuaded by someone else in the 
organization who does. If a is greater than 3 , then the member sees his 
participation as having some influence over the leaders' choice— either directly 
or indirectly in conjunction with other members' participation. In a central­
ized system, then, a and 3 are based on the leaders' preference patterns and 
upon their susceptibility to influence from the rank-and-file.
In a decentralized system, 3 represents the likelihood that the quorum 
rule will be met and that a majority of those voting will share A's preference.
A difference between a and 3 may be due to A's expectation that his participa­
tion has any of three effects. His participation can contribute to the
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existence of a quorum, without which a decision cannot be reached. Second, 
his participation includes a vote which directly affects the probability of 
his preference being selected as the group outcome. The degree to which this 
produces a large difference between a and 6 is mediated by the size of the 
organization and by what A believes to be the pattern of agreement over•the 
issue. For example, if A believes that the membership which is likely to 
participate is very closely split on the issue, then even if the organization 
is quite large, he may attribute great weight to the effect of his vote.
Third, A's participation may include influencing any other voters— leaders 
and non-leaders. In a decentralized system then, a and 3 are based upon 
the preferences and participation patterns of all franchized members and upon 
their susceptibility to influence from A,
In the decentralized system, a can be greater than 3 even if the member 
feels he has no influence, direct or indirect, over the leaders and even if 
the leaders are believed to be unalterably opposed to his preference. When­
ever A believes the leaders in a centralized system are unalterably opposed to 
him, a = 3 = 0. However, while we do believe that decentralized systems provide 
greater sources for a difference between a and 3 , this should not be- taken to 
mean that the model always predicts higher participation rates in decentralized 
than centralized systems. Highly persuadable leaders can result in participa­
tion predictions for centralized systems which are higher than, for example, 
a decentralized system in which everyone agrees on what is the best alternative.
In the following discussion and in our experimental design, we are 
interested in specifying utility structures which are representative of the 
agreement structure which is generally characteristic of the group. For
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example, the probability of A's participation is lowest as a approximates 3 
and as they both approximate 0. This describes the situation of an
actor in the centralized system characterized by vertical disagreement who 
believes that the leaders are unaltembly opposed to his preference. It 
also describes the member of a decentralized system who feels that virtually 
everyone else in the organization desagrees with him. by saying that the 
group in the first example is in vertical disagreement, we have said that 
most of the members feel as A does, that a difference between a and g nearly 
equal to zero is characteristic of the rank-and-file, and that this will reflect 
itself in very low participation rates in the organization. To understand the 
participation patterns in our second example, a value for g which approximates 
1 would be much more appropriate, although a might still approximate 3.
This would result in a higher participation prediction than for the first 
group, although according to the model it would not exceed 1/2.
SPECIFIC STRUCTURAL SITUATIONS
Having discussed in a general way how a and g are specified by the struc­
tures we are interested in, we shall now examine in detail some very specific 
situations. This permits the identification of substantive propositions which 
develop out of the formalization procedure itself and it also forces our 
consideration of analytic properties of the variables in combinations which 
may not be suggested by the empirically usual. A specification of a and g is 
not simply estimating their values in different situations; rather it involves 
using the general ideas in the previous section to sketch detailed utility 
structures which represent •the decision-making rules and the agreement structure 
of the organization. In the interest of keeping this process clear and 
analytically manageable, a number of very simplifying constraints have been put 
upon the situations we are about to examine.
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The first concerns our focus upon decentralized systems. While central­
ized systems are important to an investigation of the model and to a substan­
tive understanding of the general problem, they do not directly speak to the 
major disagreement between Michels and Lipset et al. They disagreed about the 
inevitability of low participation rates in decentralized authority systems.
To address that disagreement, we will examine the model for a series of 
situations which are characterized by the same decentralized distribution of 
decision-making rights but which have different agreement structures. We will 
comment only informally upon the parallel problem in centralized systems and 
upon the possible implications for the stability of the authority distribution.
We will examine only three-person groups composed of a leader (L), the 
actor (A), and another non-leader (0). In each case we are interested in the 
probability of A's participation. We have not tried to represent all forms 
of rank-and-file participation. In particular, we do not consider informal 
influence processes nor participation aimed at securing leadership positions. 
The situation under consideration is similar to that which Union Democracy 
describes in discussing why a member decides to go to a union meeting and vote; 
under what conditions will a rank-and-file member choose to accept a legit­
imately offered opportunity to participate in a decision which will result in 
a collective good.
Each situation involves a two-alternative choice where refers to A's 
preference and Y  ^names the other alternative. Y^ designates the outcome whicl 
occurs when the group cannot arrive at a decision between Y^ and Y^. In each 
situation Y^ and have some positive utility for everyone and u(Y^) = 0. This 
means that stalemates and quorum failures have neither positive nor negative 
utility for anyone in the group. We assume further that A believes everyone 
has a preference ordering of the two alternatives. The subjective utilities
-  is -
associated with the decisional alternatives are discussed as if they were non- 
probabilistically associated with their respective outcomes. That is, if 
some alternative ( e. g. Y^) is selected by the group, A is assured his subjective 
utility for that alternative.
Whenever it is reasonable to do so, parameters are fixed in the extreme.
For example, under the condition of vertical disagreement, A expects L to 
disagree with him every time; and he expects to agree with 0 every time 0 
participates. Similarly, when we say L is perceived as not susceptible to 
influence, we mean that A expects L never to be influenced.
The variable most heavily constrained throughout is influence. We assume, 
for example, that A and 0 are always equal in their relative ability to 
influence L. Downward influence is completely neglected; we concern ourselves 
only with L’s susceptibility to influence.
With the exception of the currently insoluable complications introduced by 
permitting the operation of any and all influence processes, these constraints 
could be modified or relaxed individually. We have introduced some con­
straints however which are substantively meant and should not be confused with 
the other simplifying conditions. The more important among these are the 
following: Consensus is neither valued nor rewarded in and of itself; and 
participation is rewarded only indirectly by its effects upon securing more 
preferred collective goods.
The Authority Distribution: In our three-man representation of a decen­
tralized system of authority (hereafter called the Committee), decisions are 
made by a one-man-one-vote system; any two agreeing votes constitute a bindipg 
decision. L always participates; but if neither A nor 0 participate, his choice 
is not binding. This last asserts that the group has a quorum rule. The
- 16 -
"leader" of the committee, then, is a constant participator; and under less 
constraining conditions that we are undertaking here, he is undoubtedly highly 
influential. When we refer informally to the centralized system in the follow­
ing pages, we are referring to the situation in which L is a one-man representa­
tion of a subset of the membership whose decision is binding on all members.
A and 0's participation constitutes influence aimed at affecting the content of 
L's choice. In that situation (hereafter called the Advisory Group), L is 
clearly the decision-maker.
The Agreement Structure: Consensus: Consider first the condition of high 
agreement in the Committee. Influence is not represented at all in figure 2 
since it has little meaning if contention over outcomes is absent.
Figure 2 Here
A, L, and 0 all agree that is the preferred alternative. If A participates 
he will surely get u(Y^); however, in acting he forfeits u(E). If he does not 
act, he saves that expense but runs the risk of getting nothing due to the 
lack of a quorum. Either he or 0 must participate if u(Y^) is to be had. 
Applying our choice function to this utility structure yields:
Eq. 1: Prob. (A participates) = u(Y )___-L________ _ •
u ^ )  + au(Y1) + u(E)
Under prolonged experience with this situation, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize with Michels that the quorum rule will not be protected and that 
L will gradually assume increased decision-making rights. The model itself, 
of course, does not generate stability predictions.
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Complete consensus in the Advisory group results in a situation in which 
a = g=l. This represents a determined situation (i.e. A does not see that 
the decisional outcome is at all probabilistic) and non-participation would 
seem to be a dominating response for A.^ It is reasonable, however, to expect 
that the members would receive high collective benefits and might well feel 
very satisfied with their organization as long as the consensual agreement 
pattern remained stable. If so, then participation and satisfaction are 
probably not related in a simple linear fashion.
Vertical Disagreement: Figure 3 outlines a utility structure for A, who 
is a member of a Committee characterized by a vertical pattern of disagreement.
Figure 3 Here
L prefers while A and 0 both prefer Y^. As long as A and 0 vote in agree­
ment, the leader's behavior is irrelevant to the outcome. If either A or 0 
fails to participate, no decision is made. Applying the choice function to 
figure 3 yields:
Eq. 2: Prob. (A Participates) = au(Y )___X______  •
au(Y1) + u(E)
Let us now introduce a very minimal kind of influence into this situation. 
If we assume that, for whatever reason, any decision is better than none from 
L's point of view, then under a stalemate condition he is persuadable— i.e. 
he will change his vote to agree with that of the disagreeing member. This 
situation is outlined in the extreme in figure 4.
Figure 4 Here
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Note that this is not the sane as giving the leader the increased power 
to break ties, since that generally means he can break them by making a decision 
consistent with his own preference. Figure 4 represents an empirically 
unusual direction of influence; the same susceptibility to influence could be 
postulated for the non-leader in stalemate with L. Applying the choice function 
to figure 4:
u(Yx)
Eq. 3: Prob. (A Participates) = --,-״t— v---ttt-t— ־— r^ t־r u(Y^) + au(Y^) + u(£)
au(Y^) + au(Y^)
= au(Y1) + u(E) + u(Yx)
Equation 3 is rewritten to show that it consists of the terms in the 
predicted equation for the same situation without influence (equation 2) plus 
the additional terms at the : right which indicate the change in A's probability 
of participation due to this particular influence process. The ability of the 
model to algebraically identify the effect of certain influence processes upon 
expected participation is one of its most attractive features— particulary in 
the examination of centralized systems in which L's susceptibility to influence 
is so important.
This particular situation suggests one other interesting comparison. 
Equation 3 is identical to that for full consensus in the committee (Eq. 1). 
Formally, the situations are similar in terms of the predicted participation. 
However, previous arguments suggest markedly different predictions about the 
relative stability of their authority distributions. Under full consensus, it 
is reasonable to argue that A and 0 would come to accept L's choice as binding, 
thus setting llichels' dynamic in motion. Under the condition of vertical 
disagreement, however, that does not seem an obviously sensible hypothesis.
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If the similarity between these two predicted participation patterns proved 
empirically sound, it would suggest that the link between participation rates 
and structural change must be more complex than the simple relationship which 
underlies the membership apathy argument.
Sketching a utility structure for the Advisory Group in vertical dis­
agreement does not seem reasonable unless L is susceptable to influence. If 
he is not, a=6 =0 , the situation is no longer probabilistic, and non-participa­
tion appears to be a dominating response. The influence situation can be 
represented and results in an equation which permits a prediction for A's 
participation which can be greater than 1/2. However, that equation contains 
a persuasion parameter which does not allow a straightforward algebraic 
comparison with equation 3.
Horizontal Disagreement : Imagine now that the Committee is characterized 
by the pattern of disagreement similar to that described in Union Democracy.
A and 0 consistently disagree with each other; A always prefers and Y^ • 
names 0's preference. Imagine further that L has no such consistent preference 
pattern; sometimes he prefers Y^ and sometimes Y^• (In a larger group it would 
be reasonable to have L be a member of one of the two disagreeing contingents.) 
Figure 5 represents this situation under the condition that L cannot be 
influenced.
Figure 5 Here
Applying the choice function to figure 5 yeilds:
Eq. 4: Prob. (A Participates) - pu(Y ) + apu(Y2)
pu(Y1) + 2a£u(Y2) + u(E)
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If we were to sketch out the same situation allowing the very minimal
influence process described earlier (i.e. L will be influenced in a stalemate),
the resulting equation would be:
Eq. 5: Prob. (A Participates)
pu(Y!) + apu(Y^) + apu(Y^)
pu(Yj) + apu(Y^) + apu(Y^) + au(Y2) + u(E)
p u ^ )  + apu(Y2) + apu(Y^)
pu(Y^) + 2apu(Y2) + u(E) + apu(Y2) + apuiY^
As before, equation 5 can be rewritten to permit a comparison with equation 4 
regarding the effect of influence upon participation. In addition, comparisons 
between equations 4 and 5 and equations 2 and 3 permit the possibility of 
identifying the differential effects of the same influence process in 
different structural contexts.
THE EXPERIMENT
Four Committee situations for which the model generates a clear pattern 
of participation predictions were selected for experimental investigation.
Since we feel that the effects of different agreement structures are more 
central to the Lipset-Michels disagreement than is the issue of influence, all 
four conditions involved leaders who were not susceptible to influence. Only 
vertical and horizontal disagreement patterns were investigated, since 
financial considerations precluded testing the consensus situation. Consensus 
results in a very high probability of the group's choosing the subject's 
preference and we used money pay-off to establish the preference ordering.
There were two experimental conditions composed of groups with vertical 
disagreement structures and two conditions consisting in groups with horizontal
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disagreement patterns. The groups in one of the conditions for each disagree­
ment situation were specified־ for an 0 who is a frequent participator and, in 
the other, for an 0 who seldom participates. This variation was chosen because 
the model implies that for some situations (our horizontal disagreement groups, 
for example), 0's participation rate produces relatively small changes in A's 
participation; while under other circumstances (such as our vertical disagree­
ment situation), it produces rather marked differences. In brief, the 
experiment was designed to permit an empirical comparison of equations 2 and 
4 for two different values of
In order to construct appropriate experimental analogues, it was 
necessary that :
1) each subject have membership in a group with a designated leader 
and a decentralized authority system;
2) each subject be provided with preferences appropriate to his 
experimental condition;
3) each subject have appropriate expectations for the preferences 
and participation patterns of the other group members;
4) collective goods be provided for each group decision; and
5) participation entail some expense for the subject.
The following procedures represent as simple and inexpensive an experiment 
as possible which still meets these conditions.
All subjects were male student volunteers at Michigan State University. 
They were guaranteed $1.50 for a brief visit to the study center and were 
told they would receive an opportunity to earn as much as $1 0.0 0; discovering 
only after arriving at the laboratory that this opportunity involved repeated 
participation.
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Procedure:
The subject was told that in volunteering for the study, he 
had become a member of a very rudimentary group which, in addition 
to himself, included a leader and one other non-leader. His group 
was to hold a series of meetings which he was free to attend or not 
as he chose. Each meeting consisted in his coming to the laboratory 
and voting for his preference on a decision relevant to his group.
Each decision would have two alternatives; one would be his 
preference and the other was the prefereiice of some other member of 
his group. Each time the group chose his preference, he would receive 
$1.0 0; each time it chose the other alternative, he would receive 
25c. If the group failed to arrive at any decision, he would 
receive nothing. The subject correctly understood that he would 
receive the money whether or not he came to the meeting, provided 
the other two members were able to arrive at a decision. If he 
chose not to attend a meeting, he would find a report about its 
results, together with any money due him, in his mail box the follow­
ing day.
Decisions were made by a one-man-one-vote system; any two 
agreeing votes determined the outcome. In the absence of a quorum 
(two members), the leader's vote was not binding; and the leader did 
not have veto power. Preferences were established by the financial 
payoffs associated with the alternatives, and each member always 
voted for his own preference. For all subjects, the expense in­
volved in participation was the time and effort he spent in coming 
to the laboratory at the designated time for the meeting.
Horizontal Disagreement: There were two experimental conditions 
with this disagreement pattern. In order to provide the subject 
with the appropriate expectations for the preferences of the other 
group members, he was told that we were interested in groups whose 
members did not always agree about what was the best decision; 
consequently we had arranged it so that he and the other non-leader 
in his group would always disagree if and when they voted. That is, 
they would never have the same preference. The subject was then 
told how often he could expect the other member to participate 
(either 1/Ath or 3/4ths of the time, depending upon which of the two 
conditions the subject was in). It was further explained that we 
were interested in groups with fair and neutral leaders, so the 
subject could expect that the leader xjould agree with him about half 
the time and with the other member about half the time. The leader 
could be expected to attend every meeting and he would always vote.
Vertical Disagreement: There were also two experimental 
conditions with this disagreement pattern. As before, the other 
non-leader could be expected to participate l/4th of the time in 
the first and 3/4ths of the time in the second. To establish the 
appropriate expectations, the subject was told that we were inter­
ested in groups in which there was disagreement about what was the 
best choice. In particular, we were interested in the situation in 
which the leader often disagreed with his followers. Consequently, 
he could expect that the leader would attend every meeting and would 
always vote against the subject's preference. The other group member 
could be counted upon to share the subject's preference and would 
always vote for it if and when he attended.
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Expectation Manipulations: In order to ensure that the subject 
could count upon what we had told him, an appropriately specified 
"drawing of lots" was used to represent the behavior of the other 
members in his group. If the subject attended a meeting, a vote 
for his preference was recorded, he placed colored marbles in an urn 
and then he drew one to represent the behavior of each other member 
in his group. The vote of each "member" was noted, the group decision 
was recorded, and the financial outcome, if any, was paid to the 
subject. If he did not attend a particular meeting, the exper­
imenters drew from the urns to identify the behavior of the other 
two "members", recorded a "no vote" for the subject, and sent a 
report about the decisional outcome and how it was reached, to the 
subject's dorm. Any money due the subject as a result of the 
decision was enclosed with the report. Concern over whether the 
subject would believe we were "honest" in drawing in his absence 
proved to be unwarranted.
Each "group" consisted of one subject and two hypothetical members and 
held a series of 12 meetings over 6 weeks. Each experimental condition . 
involved both risk and uncertainty for the subject; in no case was participa­
tion or non-participation a dominating response for him.
The appropriate utility structures were specified for each experimental 
condition by using the numbers in the experimental manipulations to identify 
the parameters. Equation 2 was specified for a = 1/4 and a = 3/4 for the two 
conditions involving vertical disagreement. Equation 4 was identified for 
p = 1/2 and a = 1/4 or a = 3/4 for the conditions in horizontal disagreement.
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
To evaluate the degree of fit between the model's predictions and the 
observed rates of participation, the ratio, was estimated from the
data. Since this ratio is, by hypothesis, constant across all the conditions, 
the appropriate equation for anyone of the four conditions is as valid an 
estimator of that ratio as any other. Therefore, each of the four equations 
was solved separately and the four estimates were then weighted by sample size 
and averaged. The final estimate (2.37) was used in those same equations to 
solve for the theoretical participation rates.
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This procedure also assumes that the ratio of any two utilities is 
approximately the same across subjects and that, for any given subject, it 
remains essentially unchanged over trials. Hore precisely, we assumed that 
an individual's utility for some object (e.g. $1 .00) takes the form of a 
distribution with a very small variance around a fixed mean. Averaging over 
individuals assumes that all subjects share the same fixed mean utility for 
that object. While these assumptions are fairly usual in research of this sort 
they are by no means obviously appropriate. For example, the utility of the 
effort involved in participation was probably not that similar for all the 
subjects in these experiments nor for any given subject over trials. We 
suspect that the utility estimates contain some degree of error; secondary 
analysis supported the assumption that the error was random and did not systema­
tically bias the findings.
The following table presents the predicted and observed rates for the 
four experimental conditions.
Table 1 Here
The rank ordering of the participation rates is as predicted. The rates 
for conditions 1 and 2 fit the model's predictions correctly. What is proble­
matic is the difference between the rates for conditions 2 and 3 and the 
difference between the rates for conditions 3 and 4. With respect to the 
former, the predicted difference and the observed difference are both so small 
that it is difficult to say in any conclusive way whether the data confirm or 
disconfirm the model. The observed rates for conditions 2 and 3 are within 
.05 of each other, however, and this is the maximum difference which the model
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predicts for these two conditions. Neither is widely divergent from the 
predicted .53. However, the observed rate of participation for condition 4 
is simply too high. No set of hypothetical numbers leads to the model's 
predicting rates for conditions 3 and 4 which are as close together as those 
observed. Detailed examination of the data as well as careful scrutiny of 
the residence patterns of the subjects did not suggest an explanation for 
this high rate in which we had any confidence.
In one attempt to identify the source of lack of fit, the data were 
separated into two parts by day of trial (Monday or Thursday). When new 
predictions were generated for each of the two partitions, the pattern of fit 
was essentially unchanged except for the problematic fourth condition. The 
six Thursday trials showed closer fit (.32 predicted, .36 observed) and most 
of the lack of fit seems to have occured on the Monday trials (.43 predicted, 
.52 observed).
In spite of the lack of fit for condition 4, we feel the results are 
very encouraging. Rank order predictions were correct and stable. Numerical 
predictions were close to the observed rates for all conditions but one, and 
secondary analysis suggests that the model's predictions may be inaccurate for 
only half of the trials in even that condition. The overall degree of fit 
does support the idea that markedly different participation rates are possible 
in decentralized systems and that the theoretical propositions discussed as 
accounting for those differences may be largely correct.
Empirical investigation of the fine-structure of the model was less 
supportive. The model implied that the experiment would be an independent 
g
trials process; however a strong one-step inter-trial dependency was observed 
and it did not appear to be a function of the pay-off structure. It is not
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clear \ihether the observed inter-trial dependency is a result of some artifact 
of the experiment which is relatively unimportant theoretically or whether it 
reflects some as yet unattended to dynamic which is intrinsically important 
to an understanding of the participation process. Even if the latter is the 
case, however, our guess is that variations is the every-day empirical world 
are sufficiently strong as to make the effect of this dependency négligeable, 
and it does not differentiate between structurally different situations. 
Nevertheless, the sequential nature of the process requires further theoretical 
and empirical study.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The main impetus for this particular research design was to provide pre­
liminary empirical data with which to evaluate the theoretical formulation and 
to do so in a way which bears on the argument between Lipset and Michels 
regarding the conditions which affect rates of participation in decentralized 
authority systems. The evidence does, we think, support the contention that 
it is possible to have a wide range of participation rates in decentralized 
systems and that stable patterns of disagreement do affect where in that range 
the rate will fall. However, the conclusion which must be drawn to settle the 
full argument is the one which neither Lipset nor Michels questions— namely, 
that high participation rates do, in fact, prevent centralization. While we 
have made informal comments about that issue throughout this paper, in no 
way have we even attempted to empirically test that idea.
Examination of the stability hypothesis is not straightforward unless one 
considers only the narrow case of whether subjects who are active in a decen­
tralized authority system will refuse to accept as binding decisions which are 
made illegally. If our previous discussion is correct, an adequate empirical
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investigation of the stability hypothesis entails not only that but at least:
a) verifying that members of a high-eonsensus, decentralized system 
will not protect their rules of decision and wi1 1, in fact, choose 
to give their leader increased discretion rights;
b) investigating how the variables discussed here affect participation 
in centralized systems and how participation affects the stability 
of such systems; and
c) investigating the relative stability of the various patterns of 
agreement and disagreement in both centralized and decentralized 
systems,
In addition to an empirical investigation of the stability hypothesis and 
to research bearing upon the fine structure of the model, our discussion 
strongly argues for a specification of the relationship between morale (or 
satisfaction) and participation, since it does not appear that they have a 
simple linear relationship to each other. Our discussion also suggests a way 
to go about a systematic investigation of specific influence processes as they 
operate in structurally different groups.
Finally, the issue in most immediate need of further study is one raised 
by the size of our experimental groups. Since there were only three members 
per group, each individual vote had a strong impact on the decisional outcome. 
Such high individual efficacy produces marked differences between a and 8•
Hie model predicts the highest participation rates when a is substantially 
greater than 6, and we believe that captures an empirically sound proposition. 
(Participation does not depend solely upon such high efficacy; the model 
predicts total inactivity only if all the decisional alternatives have no 
utility for the member). Under many structural conditions, increasing group 
size reduces the difference between aand 3. (That is, as membership size 
gets large, the individual feels that his own participation is not likely to 
increise the probability of the group’s chosing his preferred outcome). As
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the differences between a and 6 approximates 0 , the model's predictions have 
a ceiling of 50%. Theoretically, that ceiling is attractive; we believe that 
a model which routinely predicted participation rates in excess of that for 
large organizations would be empirically untennable.
In spite of its theoretical attraction, this feature created a difficulty 
in designing this first set of experiments. As suggested above, the use of 
large groups entails discriminating between participation rates with a much 
narrower range than the ones we studied (all of them would have been below 50%) 
Since our design was longitudinal and there was no way to estimate the effect 
of uncontrolled factors which might operate between trials, we anticipated 
possible interpretation problems. Exaggerating the effects in which we were 
interested by restricting group size permitted us to generate a very unambiguov. 
pattern of predictions (one very high, one very low, and two clearly different 
from the others but within .05 of each other).
In addition, the use of large groups requires a theoretical decision we 
preferred to delay until preliminary evidence was in. We have argued that in 
small groups, the individual has expectations about each other member. At some 
point, the group undoubtedly becomes too large for such an individualized 
process. Since there are several alternative ways a member might aggregate 
information he has about large numbers of people, interpretation of ambiguous 
findings might have been complicated by our wondering whether we had appropri­
ately conceptualized and operationalized this aggregation process.
In brief, we chose to construct three-person groups to avoid a set of 
problems which might have made interpretation impossible. However, in view of 
the encouraging results reported here, the obvious next step is to test the
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discriminatory power of the model in larger and structurally more complex 
situations. Succeeding in that means we will be able to explait our formula­
tion to say something about what "size" most properly names— a substantive 
variable, not a problem in methodology.
FOOTNOTES
1. This criterion of difference is still generally accepted among sociol­
ogists; even Craig and Gross (1970,p. 22) who heavily criticized the simple 
linear use of observed participation rates at union meetings and the like 
to infer degree of democracy, admit; "Nevertheless, it would seem that one 
can hardly speak of any organization as democratic if at least the opportinity 
for participation is not present."
2. Michels did imply that dissatisfaction with the actions of leaders 
could motivate the rank-and-file to action; but in his dynamic this occurs 
only after the development of an entrenched oligarchy which has been coopted 
into the ruling class, at which point the rank-and-file are already so removed 
from decision-making activities that their participation is ineffective.
3. Lipset, et.al, argued that in a two-party system: 1) the members can keep 
rewards of high office low and thereby reduce the amount of vested interests 
that leaders develop in keeping them (pp. 59-67; 238-246); 2) multiple leader­
ship levels internal recruitment of leaders and high turnover in office are 
likely, and all of these serve to reduce the differential task competence 
between leaders and non-leaders (chapters 10-11); and 3) the belief in the 
efficiency of small decision-making units is weakened by the "suspicion of 
officialdom" which legitimacy of opposition induces (pp. 60-69; & chapter 12).
4. The decision to let uiY^) = 0 was made primarily to simplify presentation 
although its substantive interpretation is reasonable; it can, of course, 
take on other values, both positive and negative.
5. The following discussion of authority and binding decisions is based 
heavily upon chpater 2 in Gamson's Power and Discontent. We refer the reader 
to that chapter for a more detailed elaboration of the arguments we make in 
the next few paragraphs.
Footnotes, Page 2
6. This line of reasoning does not contradict the Union Democracy contention 
that social rewards associated with participation ought to be built into the 
utility structures. We have also chosen not to deal with that proposition for 
reasons discussed earlier in the paper.
7. We refer the reader to another paper by the second author (Camilleri, 
et. al., forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the problem of dominance 
with regard to the use of this choice function. While we plan to reconsider 
this issue, at present we choose not to apply the model whenver a = 8 > since 
by the criteria in that paper, non-participation is a dominating response 
under that condition for the particular situation (s) we describe here.
8. We were not attempting to simulate the typical participation sequence of 
a member of a labor union, for example, in which changes in the utility of 
decisional alternatives between any two meetings can be great. From our point 
of view, the same experiment could have been executed using a larger sample 
and having each subject participate once.
u(Yx)
u (Y2)
A Participates : u(E) +
u(Yx)
u (Y2)
u(Y2) = 0 
u(Yx) > 0
a > 3
Figure 1: General utility structure for Actor
Outcome
u(Yj)
u(Yx)
0 ++Y,
■Y : u(E) +
u(Yx)
u(Y3) = 0 
(No Quorum)
L -*->־ Y,' N ,
Y^'. Participates by voting for Y^
-f-+ Y^ I Does not participate
a: A's expectation of the likelihood that 0 will participate
Figure 2: Utility structure for an Actor in a Committee characterized by 
consensus. All members prefer Y^ .
Outcome
Y ! -------- L • ״ ■ Y2 u C Y )
■ h  Yj --------  t ־«■ Y 2 u(Yj) - 0
(Stalemate)
u(Y3) = 0 
(Stalemate)
u(Y3) = 0 
(No Quorum)
■h Y1
1 *A f + Y
■+■+■ Y^: Participates by voting for Y^.
-h■ Y^: Does not participate.
a: A's expectation of the likelihood that 0 will participate.
Figure 3: Utility structure for an Actor in a Committee characterized 
by vertical disagreement. A and 0 prefer Y , L prefers Y 
and L cannot be influenced.
YlSu(E)
Outcome
u(Y1)
u(Y3) = 0 
(No Quorum)
L־~ Y X u(Yx)C1 1 ־
L » Y ,
C! *» 1
L ־*־?־ Y,
Participates by voting for Y^ .li*
1־* Y^: Does not participate.
a: A's expectation of the likelihood that 0 will participate.
c.: Change parameter; A's expectation that L can be influenced to 
vote against his■preference if in a stalemate.
c_: Change parameter; A's expectation that L can be influenced to 
vote against his preference if both A and 0 disagree with him.
Figure 4: Utility structure/for an actor in a Committee characterized by vertical 
disagreement. A and 0 prefer Y^; L prefers Y^. L can be influenced.
-*
Outcome
“< VL ־»־ Y,
u (Y2)
u(Yx)
u(Y3) = 0 
(Stalemate) 
u(Y ) - 0 
(Stalemate)
u (Y2)
u(Y3) - 0 
(Ho Quorum)
u(Y3) - 0 
(No Quorum)
L ־*־־*־ Y,
L ־+־+־ Y,
L -*־*» Y,
־*־*• Y,
־*־*־ Y.
0 ־<־► Y,
0 -♦־♦־ Y,
-h y.
-*־*■ Y^: Participates by voting for Y^
•/־>■ Y^: Does not participate 
a: A's expectation of the likelihood that 0 will participate 
ps Preference parameter; A’s expectation that L will prefer Y^
Figure 5: Utility structure for an actor in a Committee characterized by 
horizontal disagreement. A prefers Y^; 0 prefers Y2; L cannot 
be influenced.
Table 1
RESULTS
Observed (N X No. 
Rates________ N______ of Trials)
.65 21 (252)
.52 21 (252)
.47 23 (276)
.44 19 (228)
Predicted 
Condition____________________Rates
1. Vertical Disagreement
Active Other .64
2. Horizontal Disagreement 
Active Other .53
3. Horizontal Disagreement 
Inactive Other .53
4. Vertical Disagreement 
Inactive Other .37
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